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If the term ‘family business’ conjures up images 
of your local mom-and-pop store, you may be 
surprised at the huge part that family-owned 
companies play in the world economy; they 
account for more than a third of Fortune 500 
companies, and half of the 1,204 unique ﬁrms that 
make up the S&P 1500 index.
Most companies are subject to the ‘agency 
problem’, which arises from a conﬂict of interest 
between the company’s management and its 
shareholders. The manager, serving as an agent 
for the shareholders, is expected to make 
decisions that will maximise shareholder wealth. 
Managers, however, also have an interest in 
maximising their own wealth.
This problem is exacerbated in family-owned 
businesses, which have an incentive to promote 
family interests. “To ensure that family members 
do not take advantage of other shareholders, 
it is important to have good monitoring and 
control in family ﬁrms,” says Professor Chen Xia 
of SMU’s School of Accountancy, who studies 
corporate governance and ﬁnancial management 
of family-owned businesses.
Professor Chen’s interest in family ﬁrms began 
while she was pursuing her doctorate at the 
University of Chicago, US. It was there that she 
became aware of the importance of family-owned 
businesses not only to corporate America but 
also to the country’s entire economy. Nearly 90% 
of all business enterprises in North America 
are family-owned, and family businesses also 
account for half of the US GDP and employ more 
than half of its labour force.
Professor Chen says that her studies focus on 
American family-owned ﬁrms because most of 
them are publicly traded, making it easier for her 
to obtain data. This kind of transparency is not 
available for Asian family ﬁrms. “Asian family-
owned ﬁrms tend to be under tighter control of 
the family, the ownership structure tends to be 
more complicated, the ﬁnancial reporting may 
be more opaque,” she says.
THE CASE FOR SEPARATING FAMILY 
OWNERSHIP FROM MANAGEMENT
One of the worst manifestations of the agency 
problem is the failure to replace a poorly 
performing CEO. And CEO turnover decisions 
are crucial because they affect a ﬁrm’s operating, 
investing and ﬁnancing activities.
If a CEO who is not a family member 
(a ‘professional’ CEO) performs poorly, family 
members tend to step in and replace him or 
her. But these dynamics change once a family 
member becomes the CEO. “If a family CEO 
is doing a poor job, he or she may not get 
removed quickly because of family protection 
and interest. This can be problematic,” Professor 
Chen explains.
In a study, Professor Chen, together with her 
long-time collaborators Professor Cheng Qiang 
at SMU and Professor Dai Zhonglan at the 
University of Texas in Dallas, US, examined the 
impact of a founding family’s presence on CEO 
turnover decisions. They did this by measuring 
CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, or the 
correlation between CEO turnover and 
performance. In other words, given his or her poor 
performance, how likely is the CEO to be removed?
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ﬁnancial management of family ﬁrms.
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“If CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is 
low, that is, whether a CEO will be removed or 
not does not depend on the ﬁrm performance, 
there may be something wrong with the ﬁrm’s 
governance because incapable CEOs are left too 
long in the position,” Professor Chen says.
Professor Chen and her fellow researchers 
collated data from 1,865 firms in the S&P 
1500 Index between 1996 and 2005, using 
announcements from the business news 
aggregator website Factiva to identify CEO 
turnovers and understand the reasons behind 
them. They then performed statistical analyses 
to determine if CEO turnover-performance 
sensitivity varied across ﬁrm types. They found 
that family firms managed by professional 
CEOs indeed showed higher CEO turnover- 
performance sensitivity than family firms 
managed by family members.
“Professional CEOs in family firms have 
higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity 
because of family monitoring,” Professor Chen 
says. In earlier work, Professor Chen and 
her collaborators also found that American 
family ﬁrms with professional CEOs were less 
subject to agency problems than even non- 
family ﬁrms, due to the founding family’s effective 
monitoring of management.
In summary, their research showed that family 
ownership, when separated from management, 
can ease agency problems. But when family 
members are combined with management 
(through the appointment of a family CEO, for 
example), this can aggravate agency problems.
DEVELOPING INCENTIVES TO ENCOURAGE 
GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Although experts believe the agency problem 
cannot be completely eliminated, most companies 
try to alleviate it by implementing measures that 
encourage managers to serve the shareholders’ 
best interests. These include incentives such as 
performance-based compensation to encourage 
managers to maximise proﬁt. Shareholders can 
also directly inﬂuence managers, and have the 
power to ﬁre a non-performing manager.
According to Professor Chen, however, such 
solutions may not necessarily apply to family 
ﬁrms. “Family ﬁrms are quite different from other 
ﬁrms. Family members own signiﬁcant stake, are 
in tight control of the firms, and have long 
investment horizons. These features all have 
important implications for ﬁrm decisions and 
performance,” she explains.
Using her insights into the unique workings of 
family ﬁrms, Professor Chen hopes to develop 
incentives and effective monitoring systems to 
address the corporate governance challenges 
faced by these ﬁrms. 
